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Right to an Attorney

majorities with vigorous dissents. Considering the recent
upswing of school violence and changes to the composition of the Court, it is unclear whether future Supreme
Court decisions will strengthen or further erode the
constitutional rights of students.

federal criminal charges. However, the right has bee:;,
interpreted to include a guarantee that an indigent d~·
fendant will be provided appointed counsel whenevi
requested, at no cost. The right to counsel in staf .
criminal cases is very similar to the Sixth Amen dine~·,-.

Colleges and Universities; Education and the
Constitution; First Amendment; Fourteenth Amendment;
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Morse v. Frederick,
551 U.S. _ (2007); Parental Rights; Speech in Public
Schools; Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S.
503 (1969)

ment' s due process clause. That clause prohibits state'l?
from depriving persons of life, liberty, or property:.

SEE ALSO
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right, but flows directly from the Fourteenth Amend;

without due process of law. The denial of the right to the·
assistance of counsel is a due process violation. Conse- ..
quently, whenever a state wishes to incarcerate a defen-..~.
dant, it must allow the defendant to retain counsel or .
must provide appointed counsel at no cost. The Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights to the assistance 0 f . .
counsel arise as soon as the government begins adversaiy
judicial proceedings against a defendant.
,., ,_;
Defendants may waive the right to the assistance of"('
counsel and assert their right to self-representation)
though such action is discouraged. The violation of the
Sixth or Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel usually ·:o
yields a new trial in which the right to counsel is properly.
observed. However, in some situations, a violation will
merely yield the exclusion of evidence gathered in contravention of the right or a determination that the violation was harmless error. For the remainder of this
reference to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
refer to both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
to counsel unless a contrary intent is clearly indicated.

Candidus K. Dougherty

RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY
The Supreme Court has identified two distinct rights to
an attorney that stem from the U.S. Constitution. One is
rooted in the Fifth Amendment. The other is rooted in

the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Fifth
Amendment right to an attorney is the right that all
arrestees have to counsel during a custodial interrogation.

That right relates

to

the Fifth Amendment right against

compelled self-incrimination. Counsel may help advise
the arrestee regarding the implications of making statements during the interrogation. Nonetheless, the arrestee
may waive the right to counsel. However, in the absence
of an intelligent and knowing waiver of the right to an
attorney, statements gleaned from the arrestee in contravention of the right to counsel are not admissible against
the arrestee if the arrestee is later prosecuted.
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is the right
to the assistance of counsel whenever a defendant in
federal court faces criminal charges that may lead to incarceration. As written, the amendment appears merely
to allow a defendant to retain counsel when facing
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HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY
The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States states, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to ... have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence." The amendment affirmatively disavowed
English common law practice that limited the right to
counsel in criminal trials. Under English common law, civil
litigants and criminal defendants charged with
demeanors were allowed to retain counsel to reJJtesen«
them at trial. However, defendants charged with felonies
treason were not per1!1itted to have counsel represent tht:m'fi,;.c;
at trial. Rather, they were allowed to engage counsel to
them about specific points of law that might be relevant
the case. Though England retained vestiges of this
until 1836, nearly all of the American colonies
affir~
matively rejected the English common law rule and
guaranteed the right to retain counsel, at least for the most
serious crimes, in their state or colonial constitutions
the U.S. Constitution was ratified. However, in the early
years of the United States, the right to counsel was in
substance a guarantee that a defendant could retain counsel
if the defendant could pay for counsel, not the right to have
counsel appointed free of charge.
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RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY IN FEDERAL
CRIMINAL CASES
[n Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), the Supreme
Court determined that indigent defendants in federal
courts have the right to have counsel appointed for them

free of charge. In that case, the defendant-a U.S. Marine on leave-was charged with passing counterfeit

rwenry-dollar bills. The defendant had counsel during his
preliminary hearing, but could not secure counsel for
trial. The defendant, acting as his own counsel, was
convicted and sentenced .to four and one-half years in
prison. The Court indicated that the average layperson
was ill equipped to defend himself or herself in court,
even in a seemingly simple case. Consequently, it deter-

right to counsel was established as fundamental, whether a

defendant's due process rights had been violated depended
on the circumstances in the subject case underlying the
denial of appointed counsel. A number of years elapsed
before the Supreme Court migrated from the position that
the refusal to appoint counsel in a state criminal trial
violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment under some circumstances, to the position
that the Fourteenth Amendment generally guarantees the
right to appointed counsel whenever the state seeks to
incarcerate a defendant.

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), argnably was
the beginning of the process that eventually yielded the
general right to appointed counsel in state criminal trials.

mined that "the Sixth Amendment withholds from fed-

Powell involved the Scottsboro Boys, a group of young

eral courts, in all criminal proceedings, the power and
authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless
has or waives the assistance of counsel." With that
statement, the Supreme Court recognized the right to
counsel. In the absence of counsel, and an
intelligent and competent waiver of the right to counsel) a
court has no jurisdiction to proceed with a
criminal case. In noting that the defendant's lack of
counsel affects the federal court's jurisdiction, the Su','preme Court suggested that the need for counsel is as
much about the circumstances under which the federal
government may exercise its judicial power as it is about
<:/',!';;providing help to defendants to protect their freedom.
';)i;X'~\:'.:(~,iven that the prevalence of federal crime has expanded
t::t:{;:J~,igniftcantly in the decades since Johnson was decided, the
S/;,j,:i_{,ight to counsel in federal court arises much more fre-

African-American men and boys who were accused of
raping two white women on a train in Alabama in 1931.
Though they had access to unofficial counsel prior to
trial, counsel was not officially appointed for the defendants until the morning of their one-day trials, a mere
two weeks after the alleged assault occurred. The Supreme Court concluded that Ozie Powell and the other

2~;quent!y now than it did then.
'.¢';fgRIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY IN STATE
;CRIMINAL CASES

Scottsboro Boys had not been afforded the right to
counsel because they had not been afforded the ability to
secure counsel on their own. More importantly, the

Court concluded that had the defendants been unable to
secure counsel, the failure to appoint counsel for them
would have been a denial of due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment, given their circumstances. Before directly addressing the right to counsel, the Court
discussed the situation surrounding the trial, indicating
that the heinous nature of the crime, the hostility of the
public, the need to use the military to protect the

defendants, and the age of the defendants were all rele-

/l'.{i'.!he right to appointed counsel in state court is grounded

vant factors in the due process analysis. Only after this
explanation did the Court note that "in a capital case
where the defendant is unable to employ counsel" and

;~endment. The seeds of the right to appointed counsel

where the defendant cannot adequately defend himself or

:::-:::;;:,#t~ state court criminal trials were planted before the right

herself "because of ignorance, feeblemindedness, illiteracy, or the like," the court must appoint counsel in a
manner and at a time that allows the counsel to provide
"effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case."
Consequently, the Court's decision left open the possibility that counsel did not have to be appointed for a
poor defendai1t in many circumstances.

,\~rectly in the due process protections of the Fourteenth

', ' o;!iJ9, appointed counsel in federal court criminal trials was

'nflrmed in Johnson. However, the right to appointed
unsel in state court criminal proceedings took a more
·cuitous route to be recognized than the right to
10
inted counsel in federal criminal proceedings. The
t had to be recognized as part of Fourteenth
Fndment due process, rather than through the Sixth
'~~ndment because the Sixth Amendment is not directly
~µcable to the states.
:'fhe Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state

I' "depnve
· any person of life, liberty or property,

.out due process of law." Due process rights are those
·e sufficiently fundainental that they are "implicit in

'llcept of ordered liberty," in the words of the Court

lko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). Until the

In Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), the Court
made clear that in the general run of state criminal cases,
the Constitution did not require that counsel be

appointed for indigent defendants. In Betts, the defendant
was chai·ged with robbery. His request for appointed
counsel was refused, as the practice in Carroll County,
Maryland, was to appoint counsel only for rape or murder
defendants. The defendant, acting as his own counsel, was
convicted and sentenced to eight years in prison. Citing

'GLOPED!A OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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Powell, the Betts Court noted that whether the denial of
appointed counsel violated due process was a case-by-case
determination. In this case, the Court found the defendant capable of taking care of his case on his own. Not
only did the Court find no general right to appointed
counsel in state criminal cases, it suggCsted that the
multitude of ways in which the states then decided when
and whether to appoint counsel suggested that the right to
appointed counsel was not a fundamental right that triggered a due process violation when denied. Nonetheless,
the Court made cleat in Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3
(1954), that state court defendants undoubtedly had the
right to retain counsel at their own cost.

The debate regarding appointed counsel was altered
forever in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), a
case in which the Court asked the litigants bluntly
whether the Court should overrule Betts. In Gideon, the
defendant was charged with a felony, burglary with the
intent to commit a misdemeanor. The state claimed

Gideon had broken into a pool hall and stolen alcohol and
spare change from a jukebox. Gideon requested that
counsel be appointed for him because he was unable to
afford counsel. However, he was told that Florida provided counsel only to those who were charged with a

capital offense. Gideon represented himself and was
convicted. He was sentenced to five years in prison-the
maximum penalty for his crime.

The Gideon Court overruled Betts. The Court
forcefully rejected the notion that a layperson can adequately serve as counsel in his or her own case noting,
"reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our

adversary system of criminal justice, any person hauled
into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be

assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."
Noting that "lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not
luxuries," the Court raised the specter of the innocent
layperson being convicted merely because of a lack of
familiarity with a judicial system that an attorney has been
trained to navigate with ease. With that, the Court found
a general right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants. Nevertheless, defendants rich and poor retain the
right to waive counsel and represent themselves.
With the issue of the scope of the right to appointed
counsel settled, the Court has, since Gideon, continued to
determine the types of cases in which a defendant must
have or need not have the option of an attorney. 1~he
Court has focused on whether the defendant's liberty is in
jeopardy. In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the Court
extended the right to appointed counsel to juveniles when
the juvenile may be committed to at1 institution and have
his or her freedom limited as a result. The Court does not
focus on the type of charge involved. Consquently, in
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), the Court
extended the right to appointed counsel to those cases
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where any prison term is imposed, whether the crime is
considered a petty offense or otherwise. In Scott v. Illinois
440 U.S. 367 (1979), the Court limited the right t~
counsel, ruling that the right to counsel had not been
violated in a case where the defendant was not provided
counsel, but also was not sentenced to incarceration
Recently, the Court resolving a lingering issue regardin~
the scope of the right to counsel in Alabama v. Shelton
535 U.S. 654 (2002). In that case the defendant had bee~
convicted of assault and sentenced to thirty days in jail.
However, the trial court suspended the sentence and
placed the defendant on two years probation. The Supreme Court ruled that the defendant should have been
offered the assistance of counsel, noting that counsel
should have been available in any case in which a suspended sentence could lead to "the actual deprivation of a
person's liberty."
Even before the recognition of a general right to
appointed counsel, federal and state governments realized
that poor defendants needed appointed counsel in some
situations. However, in the wake of Gideon and its
progeny, the need for appointed counsel increased significantly. The need helped create the opportunity for the
structured governmental provision of appointed counsel
through government public defenders charged with providing appointed counsel for indigent defendants. Though
some public defender's offices predate Gideon, many state
and federal public defender programs ate the result of
Gideon's focus on the right to counsel. The public defendant structure of appointed counsel ensures that indigent defendants are appointed counsel who are reasonably
experienced and able to well represent the defendants.
Though public defenders are available in many places and
circumstances, courts continue to appoint Legal Aid So~
ciety attorneys and other private counsel to serve as
appointed counsel when public defenders are not available
to serve.

WHEN THE RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY
ATTACHES
The Fifth Amendment right to an attorney attaches when
a suspect is placed in custody. On atrest, the suspect is
informed of rights, pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966), including the right to the presence ofan
attorney. The suspect may waive that right. Additionally,
the suspect may invoke the right to any attorney at
time during the custodial interrogation or any sulJsequent
custodial interrogations.
Though the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
most important during trial, it attaches well before trial.& the Court noted in Powell, "the duty [to
counsel] is not discharged by an assignment as such
or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving
effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case." The

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
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right to counsel attaches when the suspect becomes a
defendant as a prosecution begins and continues
throughout the duration of the prosecution. However, the
Court reiterated most recently in Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S.

by the United States 1nust be provided the opportunity to
contest their detention before a neutral decision maker
and must be provided counsel in the process, it is unclear
what form the opportunity to contest will take or how the

!62 (2001), that the right to counsel is specific to what-

right to counsel will be shaped to allow it to comply with

ever offense is charged and does not apply to offenses that
have not been charged.

the exigencies of the situation the federal government
claims exists.

In Cobb, the right to counsel attached to the burglary
with which the defendant was charged, but not to the
murder of two occupants of the house the defendant
burglarized. How the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
attaches can lead to an interesting overlapping of the Fifth

and Sixth Amendment-based rights to counsel. A defendant who has been charged with one crime (Crime A) has
a Sixth Atnendment right to counsel with respect to
Crime A during the duration of the prosecution of Crime
A. However, if the defendant is being investigated with
respect to a different crime (Crime B), the defendant has
no Sixth Amendment right to counsel with respect to
Criine B until the government begins a prosecution of
Crime B. Consequently, the defendant can be interrogated with respect to Crime B subject to the Fifth
Amendment right to the presence of counsel during a
custodial interrogation at the same time the defendant
cannot be questioned with respect to Crime A without
counsel.

Though the defendant retains the Sixth Amendment
to counsel throughout the prosecution, the presence
is only necessary during critical pretrial stages of
prosecution and the trial itself. The Court has sugthat whether a stage is critical depends on whether
defendant faces a skilled adversary and needs counsel
to help protect his or her interests. Many of those stages
'fill be filfmal court hearings. However, as pretrial pro'.:~esses have become more prevalent in criminal cases, the
'import of the right to counsel has also grown. For ex::ample, the need to have counsel has expanded to some
·oformal critical stages, such as evidence gathering in'qlving the defendant that may not have been completed
the somewhat distant past. In focusing on the adverial nature of a stage in determining whether it is critical
not, the Court has rejected the notion arguably in1plicit
,,,Powell that counsel should be present at any stage of the
f:~secution where counsel's presence would help aid the
ndant at trial.
: ,:_ The right to counsel must have been provided or
;:ived if the government intends to prosecute a suspect or
'lldant. However, it is somewhat unclear what obli'il the government has to allow a defendant to retain
f;hsel or to appoint counsel if the government does not
~nd to prosecute the defendant in any conventional
This issue is of particular import with respect to
'Cted terrorists. I"'hough the Court in Hamdi v.

id, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), indicated that people held

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF AND
VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY
In McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), the
Court decided that the right to counsel subsumes the
right to the effective assistance of counsel. Ineffectiveness
may stem either from the government's interference with
the right to counsel or from the incompetence of counsel.
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the
Court provided the standards for the ineffective assistance
of counsel. If counsel's representation is shown to have
been deficient and the deficient representation deprived
the defendant of a fair trial, the defendant is treated as if
he or she was essentially without counsel. A violation of
the Fifth Amendment right to counsel-questioning
without counsel and without waiver-leads to the exclusion of the uncounseled statements. What occurs in
the wake of a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel depends on the nature of the violation. For example, the denial of the right to choose the counsel of
one's choice will lead to the reversal of a conviction. In
contrast, the denial of the right to counsel in the colltext
of gathering evidence may merely yield the exclusion of
the evidence. Yet other violations may be subject to
harmless error analysis, whid1 considers whether a violation may have affected the outcome of the trial. No
possible effect on the trial's outcome yields no penalty for
the violation of the right. Harmless error analysis should
be distinguished from the requirement that a defendant
show prejudice in the ineffective assistance of counsel
area. Ineffective assistance of counsel stems from the
defendant's right to a fair trial. Consequently, prejudice is
necessaiy to prove that the right to a fair trial has been
violated before any discussion of the penalty for the violation occurs.
THE RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY AND APPEALS
The constitutional right to counsel extends to a
defendant's first appeal of right, but does not generally
extend to discretiona1y appeals. {See Halbett v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605 [2005]; Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481
U.S. 551 [I987].) Not surprisingly, the right to counsel
does not extend to state or federal habeas cases, including death penalty cases. (See Murray v. Giarratano,
492 U.S. I [1989]; Finley; Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S.
600 [1974].) Of course, many jurisdictions provide
counsel to such defendants by statute. This entire area
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is subject to continued debate, particularly given the
number of death row inmates who have been exonerated in recent years. However, the Supreme Court has
not changed its decisions regarding the scope of the
right to counsel.
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RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS
being convicted merely because they are poor and unable
The Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads:
to afford counsel. In that way, the right to counsel is as
"A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security
much about protecting the integrity of the criminal jusof a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
tice system as it is about protecting the indigent defenArms shall not be infringed." Derived in part from a
dant from harm.
provision in the 1689 English Bill of Rights, which
However, one curiosity remains with respect to the
guaranteed the rights of Protestants to possess arms, an
waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The
explicit protection was suggested by a number of states
evolution of the right to counsel indicates a change in the
following the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, and
conception of trials and the legal process in general. A
was included in the twelve amendments submitted by
trial is not simply an occasion on which the defendant is
James Madison (1751-1836) to the First Congress and to
supposed to tell his or her side of the story and be prothe states for ratification.
tected from legal jeopardy by counsel if wealthy enough
Debates over the meaning of the Second Amendto afford counsel. Rather, the trial is viewed as the process
ment began in earnest in the 1930s when the first
through which a government seeks to impose the power
federal gun-control laws were passed; those debates inof the criminal justice system on one of its citizens or
tensified in the late 1960s, continuing into the midsubjects. Consequently, fairness dictates that the govern1990s as federal gun-control laws expanded. At the same
ment guarantee that defendants can adequately defend
time, what had been the prevailing consensus-that gunthemselves, when necessaiy with the assistance of
control laws raised no serious constitutional questionsappointed counsel, before the government can exact
fragmented, with many respected constitutional law
punishment for a crime. The need for the government to
experts conceding, sometimes reluctantly, that the Secmal(e sure that defendants are protected exists uneasily
ond Amendment did offer some protection for private
alongside allowing defendants to represent themselves,
gun ownership.
given the Court's admonition that laypeople have no
Contemporaneously, cracks appeared in the judicial
business representing themselves even in fairly simple
consensus, formerly dismissive of the notion that the
Second Amendment protected any individual right. In
criminal matters.
2007 a petition for certiorari was filed asking the U.S.
SEE ALSO Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428
Supreme Court to rule on the constitutionality of the
(2000); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963);
District of Columbia's total ban on handgun possession,
Hamdi v. Rumsfa!d, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); In re Gault,
which was struck down by the D.C. Court of Appeals.
387 U.S. 1 (1967); Lewis, Anthony; Miranda Warnings;
The Supreme Court agreed, in November of 2007, to
Sixth Amendment
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